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I. Introduction 
 
We live in an age of global mass migration.
1
 Nearly 200 million people today live outside the 
borders of the countries in which they were born, a higher number than ever before. If they 
constituted a single country, it would be about the fifth most populous in the world—and it 
would be growing faster than any other. About a fifth of this hypothetical country of 
immigrants—more than 38 million—lives in the United States (US), comprising between 12 
and 13 percent of the US population. (Although the US has more immigrants than any single 
country, Europe is home to about a third of the world total.)  
 
The United Nations divided the 191 million immigrants in the world in 2005 into three nearly 
equal sized stocks: 67 million who moved from developed countries (“North”) either to other 
developed countries or to developing countries (“South”); 62 million who moved from 
developing South to developed North; and 61 million who moved from one developing country 
to another.
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North → North: 53 million 
North → South: 14 million 
South → North:  62 million 
South → South: 61 million 
 
Those who debate immigration in states such as Indiana tend to focus on the flow of immigrants 
from South to North. This Working Paper explores the importance to Indiana of working-age 
people moving from Mexico and Latin America, Asia, and Africa. For many of the state’s 
counties, this inflow is the main factor keeping their populations—and thus their economies—
from shrinking dramatically. But the South-to-North flow to Indiana is not the only one that 
matters. Until not too long ago, most of the state’s immigrant population came from other 
developed countries, particularly in Europe. Immigrants from Europe, Japan, and other “North” 
countries (which include Australia and New Zealand) may become even more vital as Indiana’s 
cutting-edge corporations in fields such as the life sciences and information technology compete 
for the world’s very best educated and most creative talents. Of course many of these highly 
skilled creative talents come from the South as well.  
 
In short, immigration is a more complex story than much of our current public discourse 
recognizes.  
 
We propose to make the story both more and less complicated. As the first product of 
Sagamore’s 18-month Immigration and Higher Education Project, this Working Paper examines 
several important contextual issues. According to the latest available data, 242,281 residents of 
Indiana were born outside the US. Far more dramatic than the number of immigrants who now 
call Indiana home is the speed with which the state’s immigrant population is growing, 
particularly relative to other trends in the state’s population. In the first five years of this decade, 
the immigrant population grew by almost 56,000. This may seem tiny compared to global 
patterns of mass migration, but it certainly matters to the state. From 2000 to 2005, Indiana’s 
total population grew by just less than 13,000, suggesting Indiana would have suffered outright 
population decline if not for immigrant growth.
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Section II, which follows this introductory section, looks at one of the most important factors 
driving immigration in Indiana (and the world’s other developed economies): A combination of 
declining fertility rates and lengthening life-spans is producing an aging population in which 
soon a shrinking workforce will be expected to support a rapidly increasing retired population. 
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All other things being equal, attracting more immigrants may be the state’s best chance to 
defuse this impending and inevitable demographic crunch.  
 
Section III and Appendix 1 look more carefully at the state’s immigrants, at their home 
countries and at where they are settling in Indiana. This is a relatively superficial analysis: later 
parts of the study of immigration and higher education will examine in greater depth the 
implications of differences between different national groups. Section III introduces a theme 
that Section IV analyzes more thoroughly: Not every region in Indiana will benefit from a 
booming state economy. Most of the industries that policymakers have identified as most 
important for strong economic growth will cluster in and around Indianapolis, leaving much of 
the rest of the state scrambling to survive. The exception is advanced manufacturing, which may 
benefit communities around the state outside the Indianapolis metro-cluster. Which path the 
state follows will have critical implications for immigrants and for worker training.  
 
Section V examines the jobs that are likely to emerge in Indiana over the next several years. 
Paradoxically perhaps, the best forecasts available seem to say that jobs of the future will 
require both more and little education and training. The paradox is in part resolved when new 
jobs that are created (and tend to require more education) are distinguished from existing jobs 
that will require replacements (and reflect existing needs for skills and education). This doesn’t 
necessarily mean the “good jobs” are necessarily the new occupations requiring higher 
education, even though they are indeed likely to pay much better than the jobs requiring little 
education. The new jobs may be particularly vulnerable to being shifted abroad, or “off-shored.” 
Section VI introduces ways of rooting new jobs in Indiana and ways to protect them from off-
shoring, which will make it even more essential to be able to bring the right workers to the state.  
 
Section VII concludes by raising some of the educational issues that will form the bases of the 
project’s next two Working Papers. Put quite simply, some groups of immigrants are, on 
average, much better educated than US-born Hoosiers; others, on average, have much less 
education. One challenge is to avoid creating a multi-generational ethnic underclass of poorly 
skilled and under-educated workers. To increase the competitiveness of Indiana’s highest value-
added industries the state must attract as many college-educated immigrants as possible, which 
will mean providing world-class educational opportunities for their children. Doing both is still 
possible, though time is short and the challenge is daunting.  
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II. The Demographic Crunch 
Indiana’s Population Projection Baseline 
 
Like the rest of the developed world, Indiana faces a demographic crunch, a steadily aging 
population far into the future. As Baby Boomer retirement gathers steam, labor force growth in 
Indiana will slow, then cease, and eventually go into decline. A reasonable estimate of the 
future labor force projects a peak in 2020, followed by a decade of contraction resulting in a 
labor force in 2030 roughly the size of its level in 2012. The prediction for Indiana’s population 
shows a gradual deceleration through 2030, with a slightly slower level of continuous absolute 
increase after the 2018 period. This is shown in Figure II-1. 
 
 
Figure II-1. Total Indiana population, 2006-2030.
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The official projection of approximately 
500,000 additional persons to Indiana’s 
population over the next quarter-century 
represents a significant slowdown in 
growth compared to the addition of the 
most recent half-million people, which 
occurred in only ten years. During this 
time period, the state’s population 
becomes much older. The age 
projections for 2006 estimate that 12 
percent of the population will be 65 or 
older. Estimates predict that by 2030, the 
65 and older cohort will represent more than 18 percent of the population.
5
 In an assumption 
about labor force growth that holds participation rates constant, the movement of Baby Boomers 
into ages with lower work propensities depresses labor force growth.   
 
If the state hopes to avoid the most painful trade-offs, it must understand inexorable 
population constraints as well as open policy choices.  
The implications of such a future are worrisome: severe pressure on economic growth, 
persistent public budget crises, a perpetual temptation to sacrifice resources supporting long-
term growth—such as education funding—in favor of entitlement programs for retirees, and 
other policy challenges. A wit might call this future “Geezer Wars,” but the policy struggles 
will be quite serious. Providing a framework to anticipate this strategic change requires a 
detailed understanding of baseline population and labor force projections that clarifies the links 
between slowing population and labor force growth, aging, and immigration. 
 
Indiana is not alone in facing this demographic crunch. States that manage to avoid a dark 
future will have given priority to economic growth in their development strategies. There are 
two broad elements of success: more workers and more productive workers. The successful 
states will be those that maximize the education and skills of their workforces. They also will 
have taken steps to add to their labor force populations through programs to reduce full 
retirement behavior among Baby Boomers, as well as favorable policies toward bringing in new 
workers. Some of these new workers will be immigrants, which leads many who are nervous 
about waves of the foreign-born overwhelming their communities to focus on increasing the 
size of the post-retirement workforce.  
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The hope that Baby Boomers will remain in the workforce past retirement age runs counter 
to Boomers’ expectations and even under the most optimistic of assumptions post-retirement 
workers will not significantly ease Indiana’s demographic crunch. 
Will Baby Boomers refuse to leave the workforce after reaching retirement age, or will their 
retirement behavior mirror the behavior of today’s retirees? Some factors could make Boomer 
retirement quite different from that of earlier eras. “Retirement” is not a biological given, and in 
fact the very concept barely existed prior to the mid-20th century. Instead, cultures tended to 
associate aging more with declining quantity of work rather than outright cessation. If the next 
decades reformulate the notion of retirement into a life-extended version of the work draw-
down practiced by almost all preceding generations, it will be due to the unique characteristics 
of the Boomers. This is the first generation to command the information economy, which 
imposes low physical demands on many workers. Plus, many Boomers have significant wealth 
resulting from work-related benefits contributions, which sustains them in their retirement. 
They are by far the most educated generation up to their time, giving them potentially greater 
flexibility in starting new, secondary or partial careers. 
One must view these caveats with skepticism, however. While past generations may have only 
partially retired, the Baby Boomers would certainly be the first generation to stay in the 
workforce willingly. All observed participation rates throughout the developed (and less 
developed) world show a clear and significant desire to exit the workforce that begins around 
the age of 55. After all, retirement security was one of the first aims of the developed world’s 
social safety nets. And this generation has proven itself a most potent voting bloc, so it is 
unlikely to have changes in the legal framework of retirement foisted unilaterally by a 
democratically elected government. Perhaps more importantly, there is evidence of under-
appreciated socio-biological factors that could preclude a significant extension of the working 
life of most older adults.
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Indiana will have to attract productive workers to the state—somehow. 
As policymakers cannot rely solely on increasing the participation rates among older adults this 
means that policymakers must find ways to increase the size of the Indiana’s population to 
maintain healthy labor force growth into the medium- and long-term future. There are two 
strategies to increase the population: attract workers from other states (as a subset, convince 
Hoosiers who might likely leave the state that they should remain); and/or attract foreign 
immigrants.
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 While not every strategy will accomplish both, the most successful strategies will, 
and the danger of bad strategies is that they might achieve neither an inflow of native-born 
workers nor an inflow of properly prepared and productive immigrants.  
The stakes are even higher than the population projections in the next section imply. State-level 
population projections suffer from an elementary problem: States’ population growth correlates 
with their economic growth. Where and when opportunity is present, people move to take 
advantage of it. Where and when opportunity wanes, people leave for better circumstances 
elsewhere. This means that the effects of successful policies may be even greater than the 
models predict, and the consequences of failure even worse. If measured by per capita income, 
the perception of economic opportunity is admittedly not the only determinant of migration 
behavior. Americans’ evident preference for warmer weather would be an example. Still, per 
capita income explains a good deal of state-level population growth.  
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III. Do Workers Follow Jobs, or Do Jobs Follow Workers?  
Patterns of Immigrant Settlement and Economic Growth in Indiana 
 
Indiana’s population has a relatively low but rapidly growing share of immigrants. 
Immigrants make up a much smaller share of Indiana’s population than in the country as a 
whole.
8
 While twelve percent of the population of the United States (US) was born elsewhere, 
only four percent of Indiana’s population is foreign-born, ranking the state 35
th
 among the 50 
states and the District of Columbia. On the other hand, the state ranks 12
th
 in the percent change 
of its foreign-born population since 2000: this population grew almost 30 percent from 2000-
2005, compared to a growth of the foreign-born population for the US as a whole of 16 percent 
during this period. 
While Indiana may not yet be a magnet for foreign nationals, it is attracting residents born in all 
corners of the world. Unfortunately, much of the strident and shrill discussion of immigration in 
Indiana comes from Hoosiers who see their communities washed over by waves of newcomers 
from Mexico and Central America. As Appendix 1 indicates, the real picture is more 
complicated. The data in Appendix 1 and Figure III-1 show an immigrant population with a 
more complex composition than the popular image of a tsunami from south of the border.  
 
 
Figure III-1. Absolute and percentage change in the foreign-born  
population, 2005, by continent and sub-continent of origin.
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Latinos/Hispanics
10
—and particularly 
Mexicans—are indeed the single most 
common type of immigrant. With 
nearly 100,000 Mexican-born 
residents and another 16,000 from 
other Central and South American 
nations—as well as a combined 
growth rate of over 50 percent in a 
five-year period—the Latino/Hispanic 
presence in Indiana is substantial.  
 
However, as of the latest data in 2005, 
Latinos/Hispanics did not represent a 
true majority of Indiana immigrants. 
This is in contrast to the US as a 
whole, where 53.3 percent of 
immigrants are from Latin America. 
In Indiana, 49.8 percent of immigrants 
are. No doubt, the growth rates shown 
in Figure III-1 have made 
Latinos/Hispanics a majority of 
Hoosier immigrants by 2007; but it is 
unlikely that their share of the immigrant population here will have caught up with their 
national share. 
 
A foreign-born member of Indiana’s population is less likely to be a citizen than a typical US 
immigrant, as one can gather from the information outlined in the bottom panel of Figure III-2, 
which explains that 42 percent of all US immigrants earned their citizenship, but only 33 
percent of Indiana immigrants did.  
 
Origin 2005 
Population 
Absolute 
Change 
Change Rate 
Total 242,281 55,747 30% 
  Europe 41,360 -1,945 -4% 
  N Europe 7,465 -1,307 -15% 
  W Europe 11,403 -1,974 -15% 
  S Europe 3,460 -748 -18% 
  E Europe 18,899 1,987 12% 
Asia 59,864 10,251 21% 
  E Asia 26,060 7,066 37% 
  S-Cent Asia 14,904 2,602 21% 
  SE Asia 15,271 726 5% 
  W Asia 3,629 158 5% 
Africa 12,319 5,011 69% 
  E Africa 5,261 2,980 131% 
  Mid Africa 815 522 178% 
  N Africa 1,577 311 25% 
  S Africa 669 50 8% 
  W Africa 3,213 936 41% 
Oceania 859 -126 -13% 
Americas 127,879 42,561 50% 
  Caribbean 4,592 991 28% 
  Cent Amer 108,765 40,310 59% 
  S America 7,295 1,894 35% 
  N America 7,227 -634 -8% 
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Figure III-2. Citizenship of the foreign-born, 2005, with various measures. 
 
This is not to say that Indiana’s 
immigrants are particularly 
reluctant to seek US citizenship 
or to assimilate in other ways. 
The chief cause of the lower 
citizenship rate is the relatively 
recent entry of Indiana 
immigrants. This is shown in the 
middle panel of Figure III-2. 
More than one-third of 
immigrants here entered the US 
in 2000 or later. Only 22 percent 
of all American immigrants are 
so new.  
 
Unsurprisingly, since earning 
citizenship takes time, newer 
immigrants are the least likely to 
be citizens. This is not the only 
factor driving lower citizenship 
rates among Hoosier immigrants. 
Among the fastest growing 
immigrant cohorts—Asians, 
Africans, and Central 
Americans—2000 and later 
immigrants in Indiana are 
slightly less likely to be citizens 
than is true in the rest of the US. 
However, the most important 
factor is that Indiana has only 
recently become a destination state for large waves of immigration compared to states in the 
Northeast and Southwest. 
 
Immigrants drive Indiana’s total population growth more than in most other states. 
Indiana is more dependent on immigration for total population growth than is most of the 
country, as Figure III-3 underscores. 
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Figure III-3. Increase in the foreign-born population as a  
percentage of the increase in the total population, 2000-05. 
Estimates reveal that 
seventeen states and the 
District of Columbia have lost 
population since 2000. For the 
sake of its economy, Indiana 
was fortunate not to be one of 
them. Among the states that 
are growing, Indiana is 
heavily reliant on the new 
waves of immigration. The 
absolute increase of the 
foreign-born population was 
433 percent the size of the 
absolute increase in the total population. Among states with an increasing population, only 
Illinois was more dependent on immigration to drive growth than was Indiana. To be sure, one 
could presume that those states shaded gray in Figure III-3—those that lost population—are in a 
sense more reliant on immigrants. Yet, theirs would seem a different policy context. In such 
states, immigration is not enough to create total growth. In Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, 
Kentucky, New Jersey, and Missouri, immigration is the source of total growth. 
 
Indiana’s dependence on immigration for total population growth is not only a function of new 
Latino/Hispanic immigrants. Figure III-2 shows the rapid increase of Asian and African 
immigrant populations. Figure III-4 shows the degree to which they are contributing to 
Indiana’s overall population change.  
 
 
Figure III-4. Increase in the non-Latin American foreign-born population as a  
percentage of the increase in the total population, 2000-05. 
 
Again, Indiana is second 
only to Illinois in the 
ratio of 2000-05 
immigrant change (in 
this case among non-
Latin American 
immigrants) to total 
population change. 
Figure III-4 also 
demonstrates just how 
much the entire Midwest 
now depends on 
immigration. Only New 
Jersey’s population 
change approaches the degree of dependence on non-Latin American immigration that 
characterizes Indiana and Illinois, as well as Wisconsin, Minnesota, Missouri and Kentucky. 
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Migration of native-born Americans from the Midwest and Northeast to warmer climates is 
opening opportunities for immigrants—and should continue into the future.  
The root cause of the patterns found in Figures III-3 and III-4 is the evident out-migration of 
domestic-born residents of the Midwest and Northeast. Indiana, for example, ranks 20th in the 
size of absolute immigration growth and 26th in the size of absolute non-Latin American 
immigration growth, despite ranking second in its reliance on immigration to drive total growth. 
 
Are the two issues of domestic out-migration and inflow of immigrants related? It is often 
correctly suggested that immigrants come to the US to do the work Americans do not want to 
do (or at least not at the wages employers are willing and able to pay). It also appears that 
immigrants are willing to live in places where fewer Americans now want to live. An important 
fact about US population trends is that growth is correlated with temperature. A survey of 
metropolitan growth drives this point home. Between 2000 and 2005, of the twenty fastest 
growing major metropolitan areas (i.e., those fifty with a population of more than one million), 
only Denver and Indianapolis are not at least partly in the Old Confederacy, the Southwest, or 
the West Coast. Of the twenty slowest growing major metropolitan areas, only New Orleans, 
San Francisco, San Jose, and Birmingham are in the Old Confederacy, the Southwest, or the 
West Coast. 
 
What fuels this process? Workers move where economic opportunity exists. But in an economy 
in which human capital is the most important resource, economic opportunity and growth also 
follows workers. A growing body of evidence shows that Americans are increasingly inclined to 
base their choice of residence on lifestyle preferences, then find a job afterward. This seems 
particularly the case with the highly mobile and talented workers that comprise Richard 
Florida’s “Creative Class,”
11
 but it seems true of other workers as well. Whether this national 
trend ever reverses itself, the growth of Indianapolis and Denver does suggest the advantages of 
the warmer latitudes are not the only ones that matter. 
 
It may also be that US- and foreign-born behavior continues, as in the recent past in Indiana and 
the Midwest. In this future, immigrants may fill the vacuum left by the domestic-born who 
migrate to the South and West but not much more. This future would look like Figures III-3 and 
III-4. This is just one possible growth trajectory, however. To distinguish it, call it Demographic 
Scenario I.  
 
Domestic out-migration from the Northeast and Midwest could be reversible—if the sort of 
strong economic growth that revived many cities in the 1990s and the region’s robust 
knowledge infrastructure generate hyper-competitive industry clusters.  
Consider a possible future in which the rates of domestic out-migration turn back to the 
Midwest’s and Northeast’s favor with continued dynamic flow of foreign-born into the state. 
This would not mean immigrants stop coming to the state because they see fewer vacancies left 
behind by departing native-born workers. Immigrants are drawn to these states for reasons 
besides the domestic population flocking to warmer climates to the south and west. In addition, 
communities of newcomers often reach a “tipping point,” a critical mass at which the economic 
and cultural environment encourages more immigrant-specific entrepreneurial activity. 
Information about job opportunities increases. As was true of Latino/Hispanic immigration in 
the Southwest a few decades ago, the immigration levels that Illinois and Indiana are now 
experiencing may be just starting to take off. 
 
If future domestic migration behavior does reverse and the population growth of Indiana’s 
native-born population accelerates, recent immigration levels on total population growth could 
have a great impact. Barring even greater climate change in the next two decades than eco-
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pessimists foresee, any return to positive domestic migration rates in the Midwest and Northeast 
will be due to new economic opportunity. There is precedent for such a dramatic turn-around. 
The 1970s and 1980s witnessed an evisceration of urban cores, hammered by population loss 
and recession. The dynamic information economy led many to rebound during the 1990s. 
 
An external and internal tipping point that could change the fortunes of the Midwest would be 
its knowledge infrastructure, which is far healthier than is generally appreciated. As a result of 
the concentration of major research universities such as those in the Big Ten, “Great Lakes 
states produced 38 percent of the country’s bachelor’s degree holders, 36 percent of all science 
and engineering degrees, and 37 percent of all advanced science and engineering degrees in 
2003—far outstripping any other region of the country.”
12
 The production of degrees has its 
parallel in research and development expenditures. Among Census Bureau geographic 
divisions, total R&D expenditures are greater in the East North Central Division (Illinois, 
Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin) than any except the Pacific Division (Alaska, 
California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington).
13
 
 
Hyper-competitive industry clusters in Indiana and the rest of the Midwest (the life sciences 
being the most likely candidate in Indiana) could reverse the out-migration of recent years. The 
result could be much faster growth than Indiana policymakers have come to expect. The 
increased economic opportunity that defines this scenario would almost certainly be associated 
with increased international migration as well. In a sense, foreign-born immigrants now 
function as life support to Indiana’s total population growth. Strong domestic in-migration 
would make foreign-born immigrants the equivalent of enriched oxygen to a suddenly healthy 
patient.  
 
In Indiana, the demographic crunch could draw even more immigrants to Indianapolis and 
its neighboring counties, reinforcing existing urban clusters of economic vitality.  
Immigrant-friendly policies—integration into the community, education, and job training, and 
so on—ironically could be more likely if the flow of non-immigrants out of Indiana reverses 
itself; that is, if an increasing flow of foreign-born workers is less essential to the state’s 
economic well-being. Increased domestic in-migration will happen only with stronger economic 
growth, which will reduce the resentment caused by the rapid population change. An expanding 
economic pie is always easier to slice. There will be fewer accusations (baseless or not) that 
immigrants are “crowding out” native-born Hoosiers. Moreover, the economic growth in this 
scenario would be much more influenced by immigrant activity. The economic contribution of 
immigrants and their greater numbers would give them relatively more political capital. The 
other scenario would be associated with more anemic economic growth and leave Indiana 
vulnerable to the type of backlash against immigrants that has been seen before in times of 
reduced economic opportunity. 
 
The biggest magnet in Indiana for foreign immigration is thus the same as the state’s biggest 
magnet for domestic migration: Indianapolis and its surrounding metropolitan area. The rough 
trends are sketched by Figure III-5. 
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Figure III-5 Percent growth and percent of total state growth of immigrant  
populations, 2000-05, by county, metropolitan statistical area, and  
combined statistical area. 
If one were to provide the 
same maps in Figure III-5 but 
dedicate them to total 
population growth, the picture 
would be much the same. If 
anything, population growth in 
Indianapolis and its environs 
would be more pronounced 
relative to the state. 
 
The vitality of Indianapolis is 
not an isolated curiosity. 
Richard Florida has elaborated 
on this in “The World Is 
Spiky” (a play on the title of 
Thomas Friedman’s much-
cited book, The World is Flat). 
 
“More and more people,” he 
observes, “are clustering in 
urban areas—the world’s 
demographic mountain ranges, 
so to speak. The share of the 
world’s population living in 
urban areas, just three percent 
in 1800, was nearly 30 percent 
in 1950. Today it stands at 50 
percent; in advanced countries 
more than three in four people 
live in urban areas. Because 
globalization increases the 
returns to innovation, by 
quickly allowing innovative 
products and services to reach consumers worldwide, it has strengthened the lure that 
innovation centers hold for our planet’s best and brightest, reinforcing the spikiness of wealth 
and economic production.”
14
 
 
Many immigrants are settling along Indiana’s trans-urban corridors—but even more are 
moving to Indianapolis, which is emerging as the state’s most powerful magnet for 
newcomers.  
The higher-paying, more innovation-intensive jobs available in Indianapolis and Chicago and, 
to a certain extent, Louisville and Cincinnati are now visibly driving Indiana’s population 
growth. The result is bad news for communities disconnected from major metropolitan areas, 
but good news for immigrants who can fill in the demographic and occupational gaps. However, 
the entirety of immigration will not ease the demographic pressures upon rural America in 
general or Indiana in particular.  
 
While foreign migrants are more willing to settle in the Midwest than are domestic migrants, 
urban centers are powerful magnets of foreign immigration to Indiana. Even when rural Indiana 
is able to attract immigrants, these counties tend to be in large, mega-urban corridors or along 
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major transportation routes. This suggests the patterns of Figure III-5 are a good base upon 
which to form future expectations: relatively rapid immigrant growth along the Chicago-to-Fort 
Wayne combined statistical area (CSA) and Chicago-to-Lafayette CSA corridors. Nearly 45 
percent of Indiana’s foreign-born population lived in those counties in 2005. Between 2000 and 
2005, growth rates reached 34 percent in LaPorte County, 33 percent in Elkhart County, 28 
percent in St. Joseph County, with lowest growth rate occurring in Kosciusko County. In all, 
more than one-third of the 2000-05 increase in Indiana’s immigrant population occurred in the 
northern and Chicago-to-Indianapolis corridors shown in Figure III-5. 
As such, the effect of large cities’ growing dynamism upon immigrants is fairly the same as 
their effect upon the domestic population. Major cities produce the jobs. Immigrants respond 
predictably. There is little reason to expect that this will change in the future in any kind of 
general way. Certain types of economic growth may affect the degree of urban attraction upon 
immigrants, but the structural underpinnings are likely to remain the same.  
 
The most stunning growth, however, occurred within the Indianapolis area. There are two 
definitions of Indianapolis that can describe its “area.” These are the “Combined Statistical 
Area,” which is shown in the bottom-most row of maps in Figure III-5, and its subset, the 
“Metropolitan Statistical Area,” which is shown in the middle row. As 97 percent of growth in 
the CSA’s foreign-born population occurred in the MSA, the difference between the two 
geographies with respect to immigration is minimal.
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As of 2005, slightly more than one-third, 36 percent, of Indiana immigrants resided in the 
Indianapolis CSA. However, slightly more than one-half, 51 percent, of 2000-05 growth in the 
total Indiana foreign-born population occurred within the Indianapolis CSA. This was a result of 
a spectacular growth rate of roughly 50 percent over the five-year period. In other words, 
Indianapolis is beginning to swap places with the northern and Chicago-to-Lafayette corridors 
as the chief draw in Indiana for the foreign-born. Whereas the latter has been the stronger 
historical magnet—and still hosts the larger immigrant community—the dynamism of 
Indianapolis makes it the stronger magnet, at least currently. 
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In northern Indiana and the northwest-to-central corridor, domestic out-migration is 
balanced by growing immigration, while the southeastern and south-central parts of the state 
see positive domestic migration with relatively low growth of immigration. Only Indianapolis 
and its neighboring counties attract strong domestic in-migration and even stronger inflows 
of immigrants. 
Figure III-6 examines statewide immigration. It shows behavior by two mobile groups—
domestic and international migrants—along two dimensions—total change and change as a 
percentage of the Year 2000 population in each county.
16
  
 
 
Figure III-6 International and domestic migration absolute  
change and as a percent of 2000 population, 2000-05, by county. 
The northern and 
northwestern-to-central 
portions of the state are the 
chief recipients of its 
immigration. However, Figure 
III-6 highlights the other side 
of this issue. The new waves 
of immigration accompany 
significant outflows of 
domestic residents in much of 
Indiana. Most of the northern 
sections of the state and 
central portions of the state, 
with suburban exceptions, are 
shedding domestic-born 
residents at very high rates. 
 
In northern Indiana strong 
international migration is not 
enough to offset domestic out-
migration to generate 
significant regional population 
growth. In the southeastern 
and south-central parts of the 
state, positive net domestic 
migration is not so strong as 
to effectively generate 
regional growth in the absence 
of high international in-
migration. In central Indiana, 
the strength of urban areas as 
attractions for mobile domestic populations, along with explosive immigrant growth, creates the 
state’s most significant driver of demographic change. 
 
As we noted, the emergence of a relatively statewide hyper-competitive cluster (such as life 
sciences) would generate very rapid population growth due to the new immigration. Continued 
strong immigration levels, combined with a sudden surge in domestic migration, would create a 
demographic dynamic new to the state as a whole. Figure III-6 shows how this dynamic would 
closely mirror the fundamentals behind population change in the Indianapolis metropolitan 
region. The fact that this growth is very much rooted in an emerging competitiveness of its key 
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global industry clusters is no coincidence. The result, as described earlier, is one of the two 
fastest growing “cold state” major metropolitan areas. In the event of such a scenario, 
immigration will not just be an external, combinatory trend, however. The raw labor force 
injection it provides, as well as the increased human innovation and cutting-edge knowledge, 
will be keys to any sort of desirable future. 
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IV. Pick Your Path to Prosperity: 
Two Geographic Futures for a Growing Indiana Economy 
 
Specific industry clusters driving Indiana’s economic growth will lead to particular 
geographic clustering. 
State economic development policy and workforce-development policy are targeted to specific 
industry sectors
17
 as policymakers increasingly draw from the work of Michael Porter on 
“industry clusters”
18
 to view workforce and economic development as interconnected 
strategically and geographically. In order to meet its goal of per capita income and average 
wages in Indiana reaching the national average by 2020, the Indiana Economic Development 
Corporation’s Strategic Plan—dubbed “Accelerating Growth”—identifies eight industry-, 
sector-, or cluster-specific initiatives: advanced manufacturing, agriculture, film, information 
technology, insurance, life sciences, logistics, and motor sports.
19
  
Each of these eight initiatives, if competitive, promise wages that could help achieve the 
IEDC’s goal by 2020. But while policymakers care about raising per capita averages, 
individuals care more about the distribution of gains. The geographic pattern of future 
prosperity is likely to be different, however, depending on which of the industries above 
ultimately drive the state’s growth. Some of the industries identified rely on large metropolitan 
areas for vitality; others can flourish across a broader geographic footprint. Which path the state 
follows depends on many factors outside Hoosier control—success or failure of competing 
cities, the health of the global economy, technological breakthroughs on the other side of the 
planet, and so on. That makes the choices that are in our hands even more significant.  
 
Most—but not all—of tomorrow’s promising industries will clump together in large 
metropolitan areas and advanced manufacturing might flourish along “super cities” 
following Interstate corridors. 
Consider four examples as outlined in Figure IV-1, which examines industry trends for 
advanced manufacturing, life sciences, logistics, and motor sports, as defined by the 
Indianapolis Private Industry Council.
20
  
 
Figure IV-1. The Indianapolis MSA’s share of total establishments and total employment  
in three-digit NAICS industries containing specific advanced manufacturing, motor sports,  
life sciences, and logistics industries, first quarter 2001 and first quarter 2006.
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Establishments   Employment 
Q1-01  Q1-06  Q1-01  Q1-06 
Adv. manf. 17.6%  19.9%  13.4%  12.9% 
Motor sports 26.9%  27.5%  21.3%  23.2% 
Life science 29.7%  31.1%  27.5%  28.6% 
Logistics  39.5%  39.9%  39.5%  39.9% 
 
Employment and firm creation tend to accumulate in major metropolitan areas, the primary 
spaces encouraging crucial formal and informal exchange of information and the kind of labor 
market fluidity the new economy requires. Workers and firms who generate information and are 
under intense pressure to innovate have strong incentives to locate in cities. 
 
The Indianapolis Metropolitan Statistical Area increased its share of total state establishments 
and employment in the industries analyzed, with one exception: its share of total employment in 
industries associated with advanced manufacturing declined. Advanced manufacturing is 
sometimes defined by smaller and more flexible knowledge-intensive shop floors, so the 
declining employment share might not be permanent. Indeed, in the Indianapolis MSA, average 
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weekly wages for these advanced manufacturing industries was 108 percent of the state average 
in the first quarter of 2001; by the first quarter of 2006, the gap increased to 114 percent of the 
state average. 
 
Nonetheless, Figure IV-1 reflects the fact that due to property and other costs, manufacturing 
firms are more likely than those in other sectors to seek out sites some distance from major 
metropolitan areas. One must not take this principle too far. The new economy still shapes new 
manufacturing locations, depending on access to Interstates and just-in-time delivery routes. 
Think of manufacturing location in terms of a geographic entity increasingly called “super 
cities,” such as the I-35 corridor between San Antonio and Kansas City.
22
 
 
With Interstates crossing nearly every section of Indiana (except its mid-north-central and most 
of its southwest regions), an expansion of advanced manufacturing employment could generate 
population growth (and new education and training needs) in communities throughout the state. 
Many different dynamics could shape the geographic distribution of advanced manufacturing 
employment in Indiana, and the very highest-paying advanced manufacturing jobs will probably 
concentrate in Indianapolis—but it is likely that the distribution would be across Indiana’s 
Interstate corridors. 
For the other industries targeted by the IEDC, the logic of the new economy works against non-
metropolitan areas. If Indiana returns to prosperity as a result of a resurgence of manufacturing, 
many areas in the state may reverse their recent population declines. But if prosperity is built on 
the other industry sectors, the divide between population growth in Indianapolis and the rest of 
the state is likely to accelerate. 
 
Whether growth comes from widely distributed manufacturing or from metro-clustered 
industries, population change is likely to be “give-and-get” for most Indiana cities. Figure IV-2, 
showing the 1995 origins of Indiana residents in the year 2000, reveals a clear trend: nearly 
every Hoosier metro- or micropolitan area
23
 greater than 50,000 lost population to the 
Indianapolis MSA; however, many offset their losses to Indianapolis by gaining population 
from surrounding areas and the other three major metro areas overlapping the state (Chicago, 
Cincinnati, and Louisville).  
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Figure IV-2. Net migration with Indianapolis and non-Indianapolis areas,  
by metro or micro, 1995-2000.
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    Indianapolis Non-Indianapolis 
Gaining from both Indianapolis 
and non-Indianapolis areas 
Bloomington   2,706  3,105 
Lafayette    111  6,051 
 
Losing to Indianapolis but 
gaining from non-Indianapolis areas 
Terre Haute   -1,035  63 
Muncie    -1,103  2,103 
Fort Wayne   -1,502  4,230 
South Bend   -1,465  1,497 
Michigan City   -569  2,270 
Evansville   -544  1,287 
Warsaw    -569  2,117 
Richmond   -667  511 
Jasper    -154  660 
 
Losing to both Indianapolis 
and non-Indianapolis areas 
Kokomo    -401  -257 
Anderson    -718  -411 
Columbus   -463  -206 
Elkhart    -569  -829 
Marion    -831  -1,331 
Chicago    -7,386  -17,751 
Cincinnati   -10  -1,865 
Louisville   -67  -1,443 
_______________________________________________________________ 
Indianapolis   n/a  16,922 
 
There are only two cities able to compensate for their losses to Indianapolis through gains from 
elsewhere that are not along Interstates: Jasper, where available wages dwarf those of its 
surrounding rural counties; and Warsaw, home to a thriving biomedical manufacturing sector. 
The two cities posting a positive 1995-2000 net migration relation with Indianapolis—
Bloomington and Lafayette—are home to the state’s two largest universities, as they are talent 
magnets in the new economy. 
 
Increasing economic and population growth outside Indianapolis will require changes in 
education and training that shift costs and risks from firms to the public. 
Given that the 1995-2000 data indicate patterns of growth and the prospects for a prosperous 
future based on booming advanced manufacturing, the implications for education and training 
are significant. If these needs are not met, the 1995-2000 patterns might not be relevant to future 
expectations, and Indiana’s smaller cities will lose their ability to develop and attract skilled and 
competitive workers. 
Spreading economic growth across the state requires policymakers to confront one of the most 
important challenges that follow when regions try to tap into the New Economy benefits that 
most large metropolitan areas enjoy: providing for ongoing education, training, and retraining.  
 
Educating and training workers in the 21
st
 century is expensive and risky. Employees can take 
their newly acquired skills, paid for or subsidized by their employer, to a better paying offer. 
The wise firm seeks ways to spread either the risk or the cost across its labor market 
competitors. In large cities, this risk is spread by the very nature of urban size and its translation 
to a critical mass of workers. A firm in a larger city may be at risk of losing a newly trained 
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employee to a competitor, but this is offset by the increased ability to acquire the requisite 
skilled employees of the many other firms in a large city. 
 
Spreading risk this way is not possible in smaller metropolitan areas. As ever higher levels of 
workforce skill and knowledge become necessary, the alternative is to find more effective 
means of sharing the costs of education and training across firms. This inevitably points toward 
public or subsidized private education providers that can spread fixed costs across many firms 
and smooth the booms and busts of the training needs within individual firms. Manufacturing 
employers today call for more non-degree, technical post-secondary workforce training. Many 
people attribute this demand to the increased sophistication of the modern workplace or shop 
floor, an explanation that, while correct, misses differences between smaller and larger 
metropolitan areas. 
 
No matter which pattern economic growth follows, today’s system of education and training 
will be strained. 
Growth driven by industries concentrated in Indianapolis (and to a lesser extent Chicago, 
Louisville, and Cincinnati) requires more effective workforce training institutions to increase 
Indiana’s competitiveness. A resurgence of advanced manufacturing in the state’s non-major 
metro areas, on the other hand, requires more effective workforce training institutions to 
maintain Indiana’s competitiveness. The two different possible demographic futures will shape 
the optimal structure of Indiana’s education and training system. For instance, a more 
geographically distributed, advanced, manufacturing-enabled sort of economic growth will 
increase the importance of non-traditional delivery and course sequencing arrangements rather 
than those offered by the existing, degree-oriented and campus-centric model.  
 
Rapid population growth will require more post-secondary desks and whiteboards, whether real 
or virtual. Moreover, future students will be increasingly different than college students of the 
past. They will increasingly be first- or second-generation immigrants. Tapping the potential of 
newcomers to the US is a prerequisite for long-term growth, but it is even more challenging 
than it would superficially appear. As Section II explained, Indiana’s new immigrants come 
from across the world. Section VII addresses a further distinction—the growing reality that the 
educational attainment of immigrants and their families is extremely bifurcated, to the point that 
there are two worlds of immigrant education in Indiana.  
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V. The Future of Jobs in Indiana: 
Projections of the Occupational Composition of the Workforce 
 
“Stay in school” and “increase your skills” may be wise advice, but making sound policy 
requires carefully looking at a future that is fuzzy—and yields a picture of Indiana’s future 
jobs and education that may seem dense and confusing. 
Observers of all political, economic and geographic backgrounds agree that the global economy 
increasingly rewards those with high levels of skills and knowledge and punishes those without. 
But we need more than just sound advice for individuals. Broad maxims ignore the simple 
reality that not every 16-year-old has the wherewithal to attain a graduate degree. Not every 46-
year-old has the ability to rapidly absorb wholly new skill sets. Policymakers must make painful 
trade-offs about how to use scarce public funds. A more informed understanding about the 
future of the jobs that will define Indiana’s economy can allow policymakers to confront 
macroeconomic trends with a practical response. 
Projecting the future is messy, quantifying the future is messier still—and messiest of all is 
deciphering what these quantifications of the future mean for present-day policymaking. The 
standard tool for analyzing the future workforce is official government projections about 
occupations, but these projections have limitations.
25
 They rely on a base year that is necessarily 
some distance in the past. For example, the most up-to-date projections are currently for the 
2004-2014 time period. In addition, such a projection carries the risk of becoming even more 
outmoded because only the base year (2004) and final year (2014) are reported. Unavoidable 
“rounding” in the data further affects their precision. Most importantly, the economy is far too 
dynamic to continue uninterruptedly following past trends. As often as not, official projections 
totally miss the most rapidly growing jobs. In many cases, the fastest growing occupations did 
not even exist ten or twelve years before.  
 
Let us cut to the end of our analysis, then carefully walk through the process of how this picture 
was obtained. The best available education and training data seem to suggest seven main 
conclusions: 
 
1) Future job growth will be associated with substantially higher levels of education, 
2) Future job growth will be associated with slightly lower levels of related experience, 
3) Future job growth will be associated with slightly lower levels of necessary training, 
4) Future total job openings will be associated with slightly less high school diploma attainment 
and postsecondary certification, 
5) Future total job openings will be associated with roughly equivalent levels of postsecondary 
degrees but with slightly higher levels of minimum moderate-term postsecondary education 
needs (postsecondary certification, associate’s degrees, and bachelor’s degrees), 
6) Future total job openings will be associated with substantially lower levels of related experience, 
and 
7) Future total job openings will be associated with slightly lower levels of necessary training. 
 
Note the distinctions: between job growth and job openings; and between education, training, 
and work experience. These are important, which this paper will further address below. 
Reduced to seven main conclusions, this picture seems counterintuitive, especially with respect 
to total future job openings. The dimension of job growth comes close to supporting what most 
experts conclude about the need for more education. Yet in terms of experience and training, 
future job growth will apparently be diluted relative to the needs of the past. The dimension of 
total job openings does not at all come close to supporting the conventional wisdom about more 
education being essential. The education associated with future job openings includes a greater 
share of jobs that high school dropouts can fill, the same percentage that graduate-degree 
holders can fill, and only a slightly higher percentage that those with less advanced college 
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attainment can fill. The experience and training associated with future job openings will be 
substantially less than what is associated with the present. To understand the details of our 
picture of workforce needs, let’s examine changes to major occupational groupings, shown in 
Figure V-1.  
 
Figure V-1. Net occupational change by major occupational grouping.
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 2004 emp 
2004-14 
absolute 
2004-
2014 rate 2004 share 
2004-2014 
growth share 
Total 3,056,560 302,610 9.9% 100.0% 100.0% 
(1) Management 140,200 18,670 13.3% 4.6% 6.2% 
(2) Business & financial operations 97,130 14,620 15.1% 3.2% 4.8% 
(3) Computer & mathematical 37,750 10,020 26.5% 1.2% 3.3% 
(4) Architecture & engineering 51,140 6,200 12.1% 1.7% 2.0% 
(5) Life, physical, & social sciences 19,950 3,100 15.5% 0.7% 1.0% 
(6) Community & social services 25,950 5,670 21.8% 0.8% 1.9% 
(7) Legal 14,800 2,470 16.7% 0.5% 0.8% 
(8) Education, training, & library 157,420 28,840 18.3% 5.2% 9.5% 
(9) Arts, design, entertainment, sports, & media 38,650 4,710 12.2% 1.3% 1.6% 
(10) Healthcare practitioners & technical 157,440 37,810 24.0% 5.2% 12.5% 
(11) Healthcare support 66,880 19,300 28.9% 2.2% 6.4% 
(12) Food preparation & serving related 251,640 28,090 11.2% 8.2% 9.3% 
(13) Building & grounds cleaning & maintenance 101,040 17,370 17.2% 3.3% 5.7% 
(14) Personal care & service 77,130 12,760 16.5% 2.5% 4.2% 
(15) Construction & extraction 169,110 19,500 11.5% 5.5% 6.4% 
(16) Sales & related 312,910 10,680 3.4% 10.2% 3.5% 
(17) Office & administrative support 451,160 13,560 3.0% 14.8% 4.5% 
(18) Protective service 55,480 4,950 8.9% 1.8% 1.6% 
(19) Farming, fishing, & forestry 10,120 300 3.0% 0.3% 0.1% 
(20) Installation, maintenance, & repair 139,810 13,200 9.4% 4.6% 4.4% 
(21) Production 403,990 7,410 1.8% 13.2% 2.4% 
(22) Transportation & material moving 271,440 22,380 8.2% 8.9% 7.4% 
 
 
In short, Figure V-1 shows five dimensions of data: 
• The first column is total employment in 2004.  
• The second column is projected growth by occupation 2004-14  
• The third column is the rate of 2004-14 projected growth.  
• The fourth column shows the share of total employment represented by each 
occupational grouping in 2004.  
• The fifth column shows the share of 2004-14 growth.  
 
A comparison between the fourth and fifth column shows which occupational groupings are 
expected to contribute a larger share of employment growth than their original share of static 
Year 2004 employment, and which are expected to contribute a smaller share of growth than 
their original share of employment. 
 
The state predicts that 15 of the 22 occupational groupings will contribute a larger share of 
growth in the years ahead than their original share of employment (in Figure V-1, the first 15 
occupational groupings). The considerable spread between share of future growth and share of 
2004 employment among the occupational groupings that are losing their claim on the US 
workforce is made possible by the large number of occupational groupings projected to gain. 
 
www.sipr.org  21 
The biggest difference is in production occupations (21). These represented 13.2 percent of 
employment in Indiana in 2004. They are projected to claim only 2.4 percent of growth.  
 
Other occupation groups projected to experience a significantly dwindling share of employment 
are office and administrative support (17) and sales and related occupations (16). These two 
groupings are important because they include many relatively well-paid existing service 
occupations that do not require significant education. 
 
On the other side of the occupational change ledger, most groupings are increasing their claim 
on total employment at modest rates. The major exceptions are healthcare occupations (10 and 
11) and education, training, and library jobs (18).  
 
• Nearly one in five new jobs between 2004 and 2014 will accumulate to either 
healthcare practitioners & technical (10) or healthcare support occupations (11). This is 
a predictable consequence of the aging of the state’s population, which the authors 
mentioned at the beginning of this paper. It includes some positions requiring high 
levels of education, but perhaps even more that do not require much education at all. 
(For an oversimplified image, think of the training needed to give sponge baths or 
polish shuffleboard courts.) 
• Nearly one in ten will accumulate to education, training, and library jobs (8). The more 
complex and dynamic the economy, the greater will be the need to train and retrain 
workers.  
 
The state predicts there are five occupational groupings which will increase their claim on total 
employment at modest rates, defined here as a two-percentage point spread between 2004 
employment share and 2004-2014 growth share. These are management (1), business & 
financial (2), computer and mathematical (3), building and grounds cleaning and maintenance 
(13), and personal care and service occupations (14). These five occupational categories will 
account for almost 25 percent of new jobs. 
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Adding jobs that will need replacements to “new jobs” reveals the lingering influence of the 
state’s legacy of goods production and highlights the critical importance of absolute and 
relative job growth for policymaking.  
“New” jobs differ from the total number of jobs that new workers will need to fill, a total that 
includes new positions plus jobs that must be filled due to replacement needs (including 
retirement). Figures V-2 and V-3 portray this issue. 
 
Figure V-2. Job openings due to replacements, 2004-14.
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 Openings 
Share of 
openings 
Total 742,140 100.0% 
(1) Management 26,250 3.5% 
(2) Business & financial operations 17,500 2.4% 
(3) Computer & mathematical 5,390 0.7% 
(4) Architecture & engineering 11,870 1.6% 
(5) Life, physical, & social sciences 4,860 0.7% 
(6) Community & social services 5,690 0.8% 
(7) Legal 1,690 0.2% 
(8) Education, training, & library 33,000 4.4% 
(9) Arts, design, entertainment, sports, & media 7,600 1.0% 
(10) Healthcare practitioners & technical 29,970 4.0% 
(11) Healthcare support 10,610 1.4% 
(12) Food preparation & serving related 99,320 13.4% 
(13) Building & grounds cleaning & maintenance 20,080 2.7% 
(14) Personal care & service 18,530 2.5% 
(15) Construction & extraction 33,060 4.5% 
(16) Sales & related 103,200 13.9% 
(17) Office & administrative support 104,570 14.1% 
(18) Protective service 15,550 2.1% 
(19) Farming, fishing, & forestry 2,730 0.4% 
(20) Installation, maintenance, & repair 31,780 4.3% 
(21) Production 98,380 13.3% 
(22) Transportation & material moving 60,510 8.2% 
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Figure V-3. Total openings due to replacements (Figure 21) and new  
jobs (Figure 20), 2004-14.
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The most dramatic feature of 
Figures V-2 and V-3 is the degree to 
which replacement needs—at 
742,120 jobs—outstrip new jobs 
growth—at 302,610 jobs—as the 
source of total projected job 
openings. In analyzing expected 
occupational change in more detail, 
the importance of the existing 
workforce structures becomes 
apparent. When considering total 
projected job openings, food 
preparation and serving related (12), 
sales and related (16), office and 
administrative support (17), and 
production (21) occupations 
dominate the economy’s future 
workforce needs. Combined, these 
groups’ projected openings account 
for slightly less than half the 
economy’s total. 
 
An even more fine-grained 
examination of occupational change 
shows another dimension: absolute 
and relative growth of new jobs. 
Consider the example of the 
biomedical engineering field, 
projected to add 170 new jobs from 2004 to 2014. This level of growth may not seem like 
much, ranking 287
th
 among all occupations, but because it is a new and cutting-edge field the 
importance of the occupation skyrockets upon measuring the expected change in biomedical 
engineering jobs as a rate. Total employment is projected to grow by 44 percent, the seventh-
highest increase of any occupation. (See Figures V-4 and V-5 below.) 
 
The two dimensions of growth have distinct policy implications. Whether the state chooses to 
invest public funds in the education of biomedical engineers—a job that requires high levels of 
difficult education and that is necessary for life sciences growth—could portend a challenge for 
Indiana workforce preparation and economic growth. The challenge is quite different from the 
systemic adjustments necessary to anticipate the growth in nurse aides, orderlies, and 
attendants. These jobs require less postsecondary education, and the state deems that they will 
grow at a smaller (but still healthy) rate compared to biomedical engineers (20 percent). The 
absolute increase in this occupation is expected to be much larger, however: 5,930. The large 
level of new job growth creates an equally important priority but entirely different focus for 
secondary and postsecondary education policy. 
 
 Openings 
Share of 
openings 
Total 1,082,850 100.0% 
(1) Management 44,980 4.2% 
(2) Business & financial operations 32,150 3.0% 
(3) Computer & mathematical 15,690 1.4% 
(4) Architecture & engineering 18,090 1.7% 
(5) Life, physical, & social sciences 7,970 0.7% 
(6) Community & social services 12,160 1.1% 
(7) Legal 4,170 0.4% 
(8) Education, training, & library 61,840 5.7% 
(9) Arts, design, entertainment, 
sports, & media 12,570 1.2% 
(10) Healthcare practitioners & 
technical 67,780 6.3% 
(11) Healthcare support 29,920 2.8% 
(12) Food preparation & serving 
related 127,420 11.8% 
(13) Building & grounds cleaning & 
maintenance 37,460 3.5% 
(14) Personal care & service 31,320 2.9% 
(15) Construction & extraction 52,590 4.9% 
(16) Sales & related 120,190 11.1% 
(17) Office & administrative support 132,680 12.3% 
(18) Protective service 20,560 1.9% 
(19) Farming, fishing, & forestry 3,060 0.3% 
(20) Installation, maintenance, & 
repair 45,820 4.2% 
(21) Production 119,110 11.0% 
(22) Transportation & material 
moving 85,320 7.9% 
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The fastest growing occupations—as well as those expected to decline the most—highlight 
the importance of new life-sciences and information-technology jobs. Even so, many jobs 
requiring little education will need replacement workers.  
Figures V-4 and V-5 compare the two different notions of growth for the most extensively 
increasing and decreasing occupations. 
 
Figure V-4. Ten largest projected absolute increases and ten largest  
projected absolute declines by detailed occupation.
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2004 
emp 
2004-
2014 
change 
Largest increase   
 Registered Nurses 51,900 15,400 
 Team Assemblers 68,950 9,350 
 
Janitors and Cleaners, Except Maids and 
Housekeeping 48,200 9,280 
 Retail Salespersons 86,460 7,620 
 Waiters and Waitresses 48,430 7,130 
 Truck Drivers, Heavy and Tractor-Trailer 58,660 6,880 
 Customer Service Representatives 34,450 6,160 
 Nursing Aides, Orderlies, and Attendants 29,850 5,930 
 
Combined Food Prep, Serv Wrkrs, Incl 
Fast Food 60,080 4,720 
 Home Health Aides 8,910 4,540 
Largest decline   
 
Extruding and Drawing Machine Setters, 
Operators, and Tender 5,830 -950 
 
Mail Clerks and Mail Machine 
Operators, Except Postal Svc 2,350 -1,010 
 
Secretaries, Except Legal, Medical, and 
Executive 40,210 -1,260 
 Machine Feeders and Offbearers 7,580 -1,270 
 
First-Line Spvrs/Mgrs of Retail Sales 
Workers 36,770 -1,310 
 Order Clerks 5,960 -1,710 
 File Clerks 4,690 -1,730 
 Cutting, Press Mach Setters, Ops 15,040 -2,610 
 Cashiers 77,520 -2,970 
 Stock Clerks and Order Fillers 34,740 -4,730 
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Figure V-5. Ten largest projected rate increases and ten largest  
projected rate decreases by detailed occupation.
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2004 
emp 
2004-
2014 
change 
Largest increase   
 
Network Systems and Data 
Communications Analysts 1,980 54.8% 
 Home Health Aides 8,910 50.9% 
 
Gaming Surveillance Officers and 
Gaming Investigators 200 49.5% 
 Medical Assistants 7,830 45.5% 
 
Computer Software Engineers, Systems 
Software 2,620 45.1% 
 
Computer Software Engineers, 
Applications 3,920 44.7% 
 Biomedical Engineers 390 43.9% 
 Physician Assistants 690 42.9% 
 Slot Key Persons 500 42.7% 
 Dental Hygienists 4,030 41.2% 
Largest decline   
 File Clerks 4,690 -37.0% 
 
Photographic Processing Machine 
Operators 1,140 -37.3% 
 
Railroad Brake, Signal, and Switch 
Operators 170 -40.0% 
 Semiconductor Processors 820 -41.0% 
 Telephone Operators 330 -42.5% 
 
Mail Clerks and Mail Machine Operators, 
Except Postal Svc 2,350 -42.8% 
 Credit Authorizers, Checkers, and Clerks 960 -43.0% 
 Rail Transportation Workers, All Other 500 -44.8% 
 Meter Readers, Utilities 1,370 -45.2% 
 
Rail Yard Engineers, Dinkey Operators, 
and Hostlers 350 -46.6% 
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Those occupations that are expected to shed jobs in the largest quantities or at the largest rates 
seem to confirm the idea that more education is necessary. Tables V-6 and V-7 take account of 
replacement needs. 
 
Figure V-6. The ten largest increases and ten smallest increases  
in total 2004-2014 openings by detailed occupation. 
Largest increases 
2004 
emp 
2004-14 
total 
openings 
 Retail Salespersons 86,460 39,050 
 Cashiers 77,520 37,710 
 Waiters and Waitresses 48,430 32,050 
 
Combined Food Prep, Serv Wrkrs, 
Incl Fast Food 60,080 30,760 
 Team Assemblers 68,950 27,170 
 Registered Nurses 51,900 26,260 
 
Laborers and Freight, Stock, and 
Material Movers, Hand 60,530 24,270 
 
Janitors and Cleaners, Except Maids 
and Housekeeping 48,200 18,420 
 
Truck Drivers, Heavy and Tractor-
Trailer 58,660 16,450 
 Office Clerks, General 52,340 14,800 
Smallest increases   
 
Textile Bleaching and Dyeing 
Machine Operators and Tenders 20 10 
 
Textile Knitting and Weaving 
Machine Setters, Ops 100 10 
 Model Makers, Wood 20 10 
 Bridge and Lock Tenders 50 10 
 Traffic Technicians 30 10 
 
Gas Compressor & Pumping Station 
Ops 50 10 
 Historians 20 0 
 
Communications Equipment 
Operators, All Other 20 0 
 
Textile Winding, Twisting, and 
Drawing Out Machine Setters 20 0 
 Wellhead Pumpers 20 0 
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Figure V-7. Total 2004-2014 openings as a share of 2004 employment:  
the ten largest increases and ten smallest increases by detailed  
occupation.
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Note from this series of tables how 
important the life sciences—and to a 
lesser extent, traditional information 
technology jobs—are to future 
Indiana growth.  
 
Three of the ten largest absolute 
increases are for healthcare jobs, 
with projections for registered 
nurses being by far the largest.  
 
When growth is measured relative 
to the size of original 2004 
employment, the importance of 
healthcare is even more apparent. 
Five of the ten fastest growing 
occupations are in healthcare. A 
further three are in information 
technology. 
 
The implications from total 
openings are quite different from the 
implications of net job growth. 
Some jobs are common to the 
largest increases list in the case of 
both growth and total openings, 
such as registered nurses. Certainly, 
RNs require strong postsecondary 
training.  
 
Most of the others in the top half of Figures V-6 and V-7 require little—even no—education 
beyond basic high school competency. Indeed, there is no evident educational or skills-based 
distinction between the jobs predicted to offer the greatest absolute or relative number of 
openings and the jobs predicted to offer the smallest absolute or relative number of openings. 
 
Largest increases 
2004 
emp 
2004-14 
openings 
as a share 
of 2004 
 Protective Service Workers, All Other 3,640 82.4% 
 Animal Control Workers 330 81.8% 
 
Gaming Change Persons and Booth 
Cashiers 790 81.0% 
 
Counter Attend., Cafeteria, Food 
Concession, Coffee Shop 8,520 77.1% 
 Choreographers 330 75.8% 
 Gaming Cage Workers 1,180 75.4% 
 
Gaming Surveillance Officers and 
Gaming Investigators 200 75.0% 
 Actuaries 390 74.4% 
 
Ushers, Lobby Attendants, and Ticket 
Takers 1,690 71.0% 
 Dental Assistants 4,880 68.6% 
Smallest increases   
 
Legal and Related Workers, All Other 
(OES Only) 670 13.4% 
 Lay-Out Workers, Metal and Plastic 150 13.3% 
 Legislators 2,280 12.7% 
 Sewing Machine Operators 5,140 12.5% 
 
Railroad Brake, Signal, and Switch 
Operators 170 11.8% 
 
Textile Knitting and Weaving Machine 
Setters, Ops 100 10.0% 
 Historians 20 0.0% 
 
Communications Equipment Operators, 
All Other 20 0.0% 
 
Textile Winding, Twisting, and Drawing 
Out Machine Setters 20 0.0% 
 Wellhead Pumpers 20 0.0% 
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A closer look at education and training requirements confirms the need for more education—
a fact even more starkly apparent when comparing education needs for booming and 
stagnating jobs. 
An analysis of all occupations can address the lack of a clear education and training pattern in 
the above tables. The Bureau of Labor Statistics assigns a minimum education and training code 
to each occupation: from short-term, on-the-job training to doctoral or first professional degree. 
Figure V-8 shows the percentage of 2004 employment, 2004-14 net growth, and 2004-14 total 
openings by assigned minimum training and education requirement.  
 
As with the educational attainment tables used in this report, the data in Figure V-8 is shown in 
“cascading” fashion. 
 
Figure V-8. Cascading education and training requirements for 2004  
and 2004-14 projected jobs.
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As established, the most extreme 
pressures for increased education 
and training come from the jobs 
that are growing. The share of job 
growth that requires a 
postsecondary degree is nearly 
double the percentage of 2004 
jobs that required at least an 
associate’s degree. This implies a 
corresponding drop in the jobs 
that only require on-the-job 
training or related work 
experience. A subtraction between 
the rows in Figure V-8 (the 
difference between rows is the 
“non-cascading” percentage of 
jobs associated with each training 
or education requirement) shows the dramatic extent of the change. Thirty-seven percent of 
2004 jobs required only short-term on-the-job training; 30 percent of 2004-14 job growth will 
require the minimum. In 2004, 24 percent of jobs only required moderate-term on-the-job 
training; 15 percent of 2004-14 job growth will need moderate-term on-the-job training. 
 
We can explore this issue further by separating occupations that have projections to grow from 
those with projections to stagnate or decline in employment from 2004 to 2014. Current 
projections suggest 505 occupations will grow and generate 343,230 new jobs. On the other side 
of the ledger, the state predicts that 172 occupations will shrink and subtract 37,790 jobs from 
the total employment base. Figure V-9 shows the education and training profiles of each the two 
types of occupations. 
 
Year 
2004 
Net 
growth, 
04-14 
Total 
openings, 
04-14 
short-term on-the-job training or 
higher 100% 100% 100% 
moderate-term on-the-job training 
or higher 63% 70% 58% 
long-term on-the-job training or 
higher 39% 55% 38% 
work experience in a related 
profession or higher 31% 48% 31% 
postsecondary vocational award or 
higher 23% 43% 25% 
associate's degree or higher 18% 34% 20% 
bachelor's degree or higher 14% 25% 15% 
bachelor's or higher degree, plus 
work experience or higher 6% 11% 6% 
master's degree or higher 3% 6% 3% 
doctoral or first professional degree 
or higher 2% 4% 2% 
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Figure V-9. Education and training requirements of occupations that  
are projected to grow and occupations projected to stagnate or decline  
from 2004-14.
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Nearly 90 percent of the job 
declines in stagnating or shrinking 
occupations require only short- or 
moderate-term on-the-job-
training. Only three percent 
require any postsecondary 
education at all (the data in Figure 
V-9 does not sum to 100 percent 
due to rounding margins). 
However, nearly 40 percent of 
jobs in growing occupations 
require postsecondary 
achievement. 
 
Some jobs opening in the coming years require little education and training, while others 
require substantial human capital investment, which indicates we need to look more carefully 
at the future nature of training, education, and on-job experience. 
The difference between net change and total openings smoothes much of the sharp change 
between the present state educational requirements and the requirements associated with 
growth. As Figure V-8 suggests, the requirements for all jobs that will come open are fairly 
similar to the jobs of today. Two differences bear special consideration, however. First, the 
percentage of total future openings that will require only the barest minimum of education or 
training—short-term on-the-job training—will be substantially higher than the percentage of 
present jobs that require only the barest minimum. Conversely, the percentage of future 
openings that will require moderate-term on-the-job training will be smaller than the percentage 
of present jobs that require this amount of training. 
 
The second implication of Figure V-8 that bears special consideration is that the biggest 
differences among jobs requiring postsecondary achievement are for those that require moderate 
and not advanced postsecondary training. For jobs requiring postsecondary vocational awards or 
associate’s degrees, the difference between their share of total future openings and total 2004 
employment is two percentage points. For jobs requiring a bachelor’s degree, the difference is 
one percentage point. For jobs requiring a graduate degree of some type, there is no difference 
between their share of total future openings and total 2004 employment. 
 
While useful, the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ minimum associated requirements used in Figures 
V-8 and V-9 confuse the differences among formal education, work experience, and training. 
There is no job for which one of these dimensions of preparation can be overlooked to the total 
exclusion of the other. Most jobs require a combination of all three. Moreover, the concept of a 
minimum requirement ignores the reality that workers in a given occupation often have very 
diverse education, work experience, and training profiles. Even in jobs typically associated with 
a specific level of education, there is variation. Most college professors have doctoral or first 
professional degrees but some do not. Most high school teachers have master’s degrees but 
some have doctoral degrees and some have only bachelor’s degrees.  
The same applies to the vast majority of occupations. To address these significant flaws in the 
BLS data, we will use a data project called O*Net.
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 The O*Net data ascribes dozens of 
characteristics to occupations. Its coverage includes the estimated percentage of workers in 
every occupation that have various educational attainment levels. In other words, it estimates 
 Growing 
Stagnating or 
declining 
Total occupations 505 172 
Total growth/decline 343,230 -37,790 
short-term on-the-job training 33% 51% 
moderate-term on-the-job training 17% 36% 
long-term on-the-job training 7% 5% 
work experience in a related 
profession 5% 5% 
postsecondary vocational award 8% 1% 
associate's degree 8% 1% 
bachelor's degree 13% 0% 
bachelor's degree, plus work 
experience 4% 0% 
master's degree 1% 0% 
doctoral or first professional degree 4% 0% 
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the percentage of CEOs that have doctoral degrees, the percentage that have master’s degrees, 
and so on. Equally valuable, the O*Net data treats experience and training as separate matters, 
allowing a user to see the education and work experience and training profiles associated with 
different occupations. 
 
Again, there will be a higher demand for advanced education at the same time there is 
demand for workers without much education—but the moral of the story ought not to be 
“stop educating yourself.”  
Figures V-10, V-11, V-12, and V-13 explore the O*Net-derived differences between the present 
and future education, experience, and training levels of jobs.
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 Figure V-10 confirms that future 
job growth will largely result from occupations that require higher levels of education. 
 
Figure V-10. Cascading O*Net education levels associated with 2004  
employment and 2004-14 projected jobs.
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 The difference is that the actual 
composition of both present 
employment and future growth—
rather than the minimum required 
composition—correlates with even 
higher levels of education. 
 
Figure V-10 is consistent with the 
minimum required 
education/training data of Figure V-
8 in generating conclusions that run 
counter to the conventional wisdom 
that education is the only future. While future job growth correlates with higher levels of 
education, projections show that the legacy of the existing industrial structure will create large 
numbers of openings in the economy’s lowest skilled jobs. In 2004, for instance, high school 
dropouts filled 16 percent of jobs, while between 2004 and 2014 18 percent of total job 
openings will not require a high school diploma.
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The counter-argument to the preceding paragraph would be straightforward: the educational 
profile within occupations will not remain constant, or at least should not. The current 
educational profile of many occupations may well be less educated than it should be. The 
argument that many jobs are now filled by workers who are under-educated seems intuitively 
right and conforms in some ways with the general decline in labor force growth rates. With 
regard to projections, even this line of thought ignores the possibility that individual 
occupations may become more complex and require more education in the years ahead. This 
section will return to these sorts of contextual issues after Figure V-13. They remain an 
important theme in the projections of experience and training needs, however, as the next tables 
show. 
 
2004 
total 
2004-
14 
growth 
2004-14 
openings 
Less than a high school diploma or 
higher 100% 100% 100% 
High school diploma or higher 84% 88% 82% 
Postsecondary certification or some 
college or higher 45% 58% 44% 
Associate's degree of higher 25% 37% 25% 
Bachelor's degree or higher 17% 26% 17% 
Master's degree of higher 5% 8% 5% 
Doctoral or first professional 
degree or higher 2% 4% 2% 
    
Share of total captured 92% 93% 93% 
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Many new jobs will require on-job experience, although we may see a split in the labor 
market since many replacement jobs will require little work experience, perhaps as employers 
drop their standards to obtain workers in a tight labor market.  
Figure V-11 suggests that new job growth will correlate with occupations that require more 
short- and medium-term amounts of related experience than 2004 employment. The difference 
is slight but also consistent up to the point of jobs associated with more than four years 
experience. Again, however, the story is quite different as one moves from the notion of future 
job growth to future job openings. In this case, the expectation is that total openings will occur 
in jobs that require less related experience than the jobs of 2004.   
 
Figure V-11. Cascading O*Net related work experience associated  
with 2004 employment and 2004-14 projected jobs.
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A similar pattern is evident in the 
training levels associated with new job 
growth and projected total openings, as 
detailed by Figures V-12 and V-13. 
However, there is some degree of 
bifurcation in the training levels 
projected for new job growth. On the 
one hand, a slightly greater portion of 
new jobs will require no more training 
than was true of 2004 jobs.  
 
The same comparison is true of jobs 
requiring only one month or less of 
training. On the other hand, slightly 
more new jobs will require between 
more than one month’s and two years’ 
worth of training. Again, the training 
needs associated with total openings are not only less onerous than those associated with new 
job growth; they are generally less onerous than those associated with the present. A smaller 
percentage of open jobs may not require any training at all, or at least not any more than was 
required by 2004 jobs. 
 
2004 
total 
2004-14 
growth 
2004-14 
openings 
None or more 100% 100% 100% 
Any 74% 76% 71% 
More than one 
month 69% 72% 66% 
More than three 
months 65% 68% 61% 
More than six 
months 59% 63% 55% 
More than one year 47% 49% 42% 
More than two 
years 29% 31% 26% 
More than four 
years 16% 16% 13% 
More than ten years 5% 3% 2% 
    
Share of total 
captured 92% 93% 93% 
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Figure V-12. Cascading O*Net onsite or in-plant training associated  
with 2004 employment and 2004-14 projected jobs.
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This brings us to the seven 
conclusions with which we began. The 
education and training data seem to 
suggest seven main conclusions which 
we raised at the beginning of this 
section: 
-Future job growth will correlate with 
substantially higher levels of education, 
-Future job growth will associate with 
slightly lower levels of related experience, 
-Future job growth will associate with 
slightly lower levels of necessary training, 
-Future total job openings will correlate 
with slightly less high school diploma 
attainment and postsecondary 
certification, 
-Future total job openings will associate with roughly equivalent levels of postsecondary degrees but with 
slightly higher levels of minimum moderate-term postsecondary education needs (postsecondary 
certification, associate’s degrees, bachelor’s degrees), and 
-Future total job openings will correlate with substantially lower levels of related experience, and 
-Future total job openings will correlate with slightly lower levels of necessary training. 
 
 
Figure V-13. Cascading O*Net on-the-job training associated with  
2004 employment and 2004-14 projected jobs.
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Some aspects of this picture are much 
more plausible than at the beginning 
of the section. For instance, the new 
jobs could be a factor of the dynamic 
“new economy,” and thus have higher 
demands for education than the 
replacement jobs, which bear the 
marks of Indiana’s “old economy.” 
This says nothing about whether the 
new jobs will be good jobs. The 
beginning of this section identified 
issues that limit the accuracy and even 
the utility of official occupational 
projections.  
 
Section VI discusses a few more 
conceptual problems that may lead us toward a new way to think about the difference between 
good jobs and bad jobs in the new economy.  
 
2004 
total 
2004-14 
growth 
2004-14 
openings 
None or more 100% 100% 100% 
Any 78% 77% 78% 
More than one month 48% 50% 46% 
More than three 
months 34% 36% 33% 
More than six 
months 22% 23% 21% 
More than one year 12% 13% 11% 
More than two years 6% 6% 5% 
More than four years 2% 2% 2% 
More than ten years 1% 1% 1% 
    
Share of total 
captured 92% 93% 93% 
 
2004 
total 
2004-14 
growth 
2004-14 
openings 
None or more 100% 100% 100% 
Any 90% 87% 89% 
More than one month 61% 60% 58% 
More than three 
months 40% 41% 38% 
More than six 
months 26% 27% 24% 
More than one year 13% 14% 12% 
More than two years 7% 7% 6% 
More than four years 3% 3% 3% 
More than ten years 1% 1% 1% 
    
Share of total 
captured 92% 93% 93% 
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VI. Flying Blinder than Usual: 
Thinking about “Good Jobs” in the New Economy 
 
New technology is most likely to upset workforce predictions, and employers may not fully 
understand what they want their workers to know. Man and machine may ultimately trade 
skills as industries develop and mature.  
Among possible confounders of Section V’s projections is the inevitable under-appreciation of 
the impact of technology. Official projections miss many new jobs that grow rapidly over the 
projection horizon. The classic case is desktop publishing, which in 1990 effectively did not 
exist. Over the following decade, it was consistently one of the fastest growing jobs. 
Technological change follows geometric curves, which are exceedingly difficult in forecasting 
exercises.  
 
To gauge the substitutive and complementary effects of accelerating change on hundreds of 
specific occupations is ultimately an impossible effort. On the other end of the spectrum, new 
technology can cause projections to over-predict many occupations. Robotics allow 
manufacturers to produce far more with less labor. The banking industry needs far fewer 
workers per transaction than it did two decades ago. In related fashion, the ability of firms to 
organize production and supply chains on a globally distributed scale as a result of more 
sophisticated information technology “moved” many of these jobs overseas. In each case, upon 
reaching tipping points there is a formation of rapid change which can be more or less forecast 
in a conceptual way but not with specificity. In other words, the impacts are amenable to 
futurism but not necessarily to methodologically sound quantitative projection. To stay true to 
the latter is almost certainly to under-predict the true rate of change and mis-predict its effects. 
 
Matching numeric projections of occupational change to the education, experience, and training 
needs associated with that change injects another layer of difficulty. Ask any group of 
employers whether they find the workforce to be over-skilled and over-educated or under-
skilled and under-educated, and their answers are almost certain to be that their workers are 
under- rather than over-qualified. Some of this discontent is a perception bias: Who would ever 
say the workforce is too smart? Some of it is undoubtedly rooted in the declining rate of labor 
force growth: When it is more difficult to find people in general it is likely to be more difficult 
to find qualified people. But some part of this perception is undoubtedly a reflection of the 
workforce’s knowledge and skills in comparison to the knowledge and skills demanded in the 
workplace. If so, the current educational, experience, and training profile of occupations will 
inherently pervert an attempt to understand true future needs in the type of analysis used in 
Figures V-10 through V-13. 
 
Moreover, regardless of the extent to which today’s employers feel forced to hire under-
qualified workers, the knowledge and skills needed for specific jobs will inevitably change. 
Take, again, desktop publishing. In 1990, the critical element of desktop publishing was 
arguably technical. The software was rare and fairly complex. Since then, word processing and 
other software advances have been able to absorb some of the desktop publishing functionality. 
Dedicated desktop publishing programs such as Quark have automated routine tasks. As a 
result, a relatively smaller share of the value provided by desktop publishers is technical and a 
relatively greater share increasingly accrues to sub-functions such as design. This evolution 
received an exclamation point recently when Adobe’s industry-leading “PageMaker” software 
became Adobe’s new “InDesign” software. 
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Some experts worry that the vulnerability of large swaths of the occupational landscape to 
outsourcing puts even “good jobs” at risk. 
Many worry that information technology allows employers to outsource wholly new categories 
of jobs directly to other countries, or allows global competition indirectly to limit the domestic 
growth of new jobs. How many US jobs are vulnerable to this process? Guesses range from a 
few million jobs to Alan Blinder’s recent estimate that between 26 and 29 percent of the US 
workforce could be vulnerable.
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 Blinder’s stunning estimate amounts to between 35 and 40 
million jobs. He believes his analysis casts much doubt on the worth of the official BLS 
occupational projects and argues that they almost certainly over-predict the domestic growth of 
highly “off-shoreable” jobs. 
 
The truly worrisome conclusion from Blinder’s analysis is that the education and skills profiles 
of the jobs he sees as vulnerable to export vary highly. In other words, while the standard 
defense of globalization by free trade supporters is that America will lose “bad jobs” and gain 
“good jobs,” Blinder’s analysis suggests that the effect is likely to be less unidirectional. For 
example, he ranks computer programmers—a good job by anyone’s definition—as the most 
vulnerable occupation of all. Blinder’s work has received much attention precisely because he 
himself is such a champion of free trade and an unfettered global marketplace. 
 
“Personal service” jobs are hardest to outsource so Blinder recommends focusing education 
and training on “invulnerable jobs.” 
Blinder’s key assumption in generating estimates that are so much larger than others derives 
from his treatment of services jobs. Like others, he acknowledges that goods production is 
particularly amenable to globally distributed production. He goes farther than other economists 
in his assessment of the services occupations, which he sees as capable of being performed 
across a distributed geographic arrangement. The critical difference, for him, is between 
“personal” service jobs and “impersonal” service jobs. Hence, much of healthcare is only 
deliverable to the geographic point of consumption and is not off-shoreable. Computer 
programming, which is not geographically constrainable, is vulnerable.  
 
Blinder’s conclusion is that the current US education and training approach and even most 
proposals for education training reform are strategically incorrect. He thinks today’s students 
and displaced workers should receive education and training for those jobs that are relatively 
safe from global market pressures. In this formulation, invulnerable jobs are the “good” jobs—
and vulnerable jobs, no matter how high-paying, are not. Both the breadth and depth of this 
challenge to the conventional wisdom about how to prepare students and workers for the global 
economy command real power—and demand consideration by policymakers and business 
leaders as they try to plot a course through the next two decades. If one accepts Blinder’s 
categorization of “personal” and “impersonal” service jobs, his policy suggestions would seem 
to make intuitive sense. 
 
While this may overburden schools and colleges, it opens new perspectives for educators and 
reformers who have to pay attention to the geographic and social context of technology.  
At heart, though, Blinder’s approach is still demand-driven. It thus falls prey to the same 
weaknesses of all demand-driven strategies for workforce development. In a highly volatile job 
market that may require the possession of multiple skill and knowledge sets over a work life, 
longer-term formal education may be more useful than shorter-term and job-specific education 
or training. Moreover, and as discussed earlier, experience, training, and formal or third-party-
provided education can become substitutes for each other over time. If formal education 
increasingly substitutes for the other two, there may be unwelcome institutional implications for 
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the postsecondary system if it skews too far as a perfect substitute for the other two. Approaches 
such as Blinder’s could increase their vulnerability. 
 
Settling the age-old debate between those who advocate for an occupational demand- and skill-
driven education system and those who advocate for a more classic vision is well beyond the 
scope of this report. The exciting aspect of Blinder’s work is how an effort conceived partly in 
criticism of official occupational projections, with a novel and radical policy conclusion, 
nonetheless creates a recommendation functionally similar to the demand-driven approach of 
those who would use the official occupational projections to apportion education and training 
resources. 
 
This is less surprising when one considers what both approaches share in common: an analytical 
framework that emphasizes the effect of exogenous changes on individual occupations. An 
alternative understanding—implicit if not explicit in much of the literature about occupational 
concentration dynamics—emphasizes that: 
 
• the changes among individual occupations are a function of their changing 
substitutive and complementary relationships with other occupations, and  
• geography informs the quality of these relationships. 
 
In other words, the prospects of a given occupation are not foremost a function of the prospects 
of the industry in which the occupation is found, as with the official BLS projections. Nor are 
the prospects of a given occupation foremost a function of the ability of technological change to 
unmoor it from dependence on a specific place, as in Blinder’s analysis. Instead, the prospects 
of a given occupation are a function of the value it contributes to and the value it derives from 
other occupations in a specific place, relative to the value it would contribute to and the value it 
would derive from those same, other occupations in a different place. 
 
For example, among the most off-shoreable occupations in Blinder’s list are film and video 
editors, with a rank of ninth-most off-shoreable, and graphic designers, with a rank of 86
th
-most 
off-shoreable. No doubt one could perform the technical aspects of both occupations anywhere 
(though the bandwidth associated with internationally dispersed digital film editing would be 
extreme, to say the least). However, the value of both occupations is a function of much more 
than their technical substance. Few film directors would surrender the opportunity to work 
alongside their editors and guide the compilation of video or film material into a whole work. 
The quality of a graphic design artifact is intimately connected to designers’ interaction with 
clients and usually develops from an iterative process that is not readily amenable to a purely 
virtual space for that interaction. 
 
A technology that might make some jobs vulnerable to off-shoring could also offer 
opportunities for people in proximity to work creatively—and vice versa.  
Both occupations also demonstrate the ways in which the same changes in information 
technology that would seem to promote the geographic unmooring of occupations may promote 
the opposite. For example, in film and video editing, the development of film-quality, high-
definition video cameras led to innovative uses of the editing process. To create the most recent 
two installments of his “Star Wars” films, George Lucas spatially and temporally joined the 
editing function to the filming function. As they shot footage, they sent it in real-time to a video 
editing station. They used this footage to create an initial working edit of the film in near real-
time. As the director, Lucas then used the nearly immediate working edit to make decisions 
about re-shoots and adjustments to specific aspects of the original narrative vision. 
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An emphasis on occupations’ relationships to other occupations in a geographic space can also 
help explain the rapid growth of metropolitan areas as centers of employment and innovation at 
the expense of rural areas. Again, this outcome is the opposite of what many predicted at the 
dawn of the networked age. After all, the typical rural area is a far cheaper place to do business 
than a typical major metropolitan area when it comes to issues of real estate costs, wages, 
transportation, and so on. Hence, one might have expected to see both off-shoring and 
“ruraling” over the course of the 1990s. That the latter did not occur suggests that the value 
relationships of some occupations could be nearly totally unbundled from fidelity to place, 
while the value relationships of other occupations became much more dependent on place. 
 
The key argument about this process is whether it is the technological dynamics that drive it—
making some jobs or even the same job both more and less geographically dependent and thus 
having an endpoint—or whether they are an ongoing and permanent force. In other words, will 
information technology ever stop creating examples like George Lucas’s new approach to video 
editing and just make jobs exportable as a result of their technical function? Or will information 
technology always create new reasons for personal interaction and spatial collocation even as it 
creates new opportunities to perform technical functions impersonally and irrespective of 
geography? 
 
If geography matters, education might matter even more—at least the right kind of 
education.  
To answer the first question “yes” and the second question “no” is to make a radical leap from 
the past. It is also to cast globalization in many of the terms so feared by its detractors. If one 
answers these questions in the opposite fashion, however, the maxims about the need for 
generally higher education and skills become more applicable. 
 
A continuation of this dynamic could also fuel continued growth of the income gap between the 
less and more educated. While one rarely considers this gap in terms of the growth (or decline) 
of the populations with various levels of educational attainment, the two in combination create a 
stunning suggestion of relative demand. The populations with higher levels of attainment are 
growing much faster (in other words, increasing the quantity of labor supplied) much more 
quickly than the populations with low levels of education. In fact, the US population without a 
high school diploma is actually shrinking, having declined by 17 percent between 2000 and 
2005. 
 
How to network across cultures could become essential, which is different than just saying 
“learn more” or “stay in school”—it could mean “learn to adapt.” 
This decline has yet to translate into higher wages for high school dropouts, of course, as would 
ordinarily be the case with a diminishing quantity of labor supplied. That it has not hints at the 
incredible collapse of labor demand for the poorly educated. Obviously, the changes in income 
for those at the top of the educational ladder provide the opposite hint, despite the perpetually 
dramatic increase in their sizes.  
 
It may well be that a kind of network effect is influencing these changes. If occupational growth 
is a function of the value each occupation contributes to and derives from other occupations, 
then the injection of ever larger numbers of workers who can fill the highest value occupations 
may drive demand for even more workers to fill such occupations. This notion is not 
inconsistent with many of the locational dynamics behind population growth and industrial 
change in major metropolitan areas that become centers of innovation. 
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The beginning of this section questioned how to create a more nuanced guide for education and 
training preparation than general recommendations for “more” of both. It ends by arguing that, 
to a great extent, the general recommendation is good policy. Official labor force projections, 
rooted in recent industrial structure and trends and overly-cautious in the application of 
expected technological change, have worth in the short-term. Ignoring the time lag between 
occupational surveys and the data reporting of them, a picture of the short-term past is not a bad 
guide for predicting the short-term future. As a base for longer-term decisions, the use of the 
standard official projections series is more dubious. 
 
Instead, the better approach would seem to be the embrace of fluidity. Ultimate occupational 
demand is likely a function of complex relationships among various occupations and often in a 
way that is unique to place. In essence, this is somewhat akin to an occupational version of the 
industry cluster concept that is now so ubiquitous in economic development. This admittedly 
makes the future more opaque. It also makes the future more shapeable. Indiana would be wise 
to think about the education and training needs of the future as less a function of projection 
series and more a function, as with “Accelerating Growth,” of where the state wants to go. 
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VII. One Planet, Many Countries:  
Two Worlds of Foreign-Born Education 
 
Discussions of immigration often seem to be expressed in “us” and “them” terms, native-born 
citizens and foreign-born immigrants. The previous sections ought to have made clear that when 
talking about “us” native-born Hoosiers, there is a wide range of diversity. Economic growth, 
for instance, means very different things depending on where you live, or what you studied in 
school. This section looks at the diversity in “them,” in particular at educational differences 
among immigrants. The larger portion of Indiana’s growing immigrant population has minimal 
education and few advanced skills. The smaller part stands at the peak of the global education 
and skills pyramid, vital to the area’s most important industries and prosperous firms. 
 
Figure VII-1 shows a “cascading” educational attainment profile for Indiana residents over the 
age of 25. An alternative to the standard educational attainment data, which report the number 
of a population who qualify for each distinct category, the cascading profile reports the number 
who qualified for each distinct category or better. Thus, Figure VII-1 shows that 86 percent of 
Indiana’s 25 and older non-foreign-born population graduated high school. Of this 86 percent, 
48 percent of the total 25 and older non-foreign-born cohort went on to college. 
 
Figure VII-1. The cascading educational attainment profile of the 25+ foreign and  
non-foreign-born, 2005: Indiana.
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Possess at least… non-foreign-born foreign-born 
at least a high school diploma 86% 68% 
at least some college 48% 44% 
at least a bachelor’s degree 21% 27% 
graduate degree 7% 14% 
 
The conclusions from VII-1 are stark. The foreign-born population in Indiana is much less 
likely to have graduated high school than their domestic-born or native counterparts. Almost 
one in three foreign-born Hoosiers lack a high school diploma; one in seven US-born Hoosiers 
lack a high school degree. The foreign-born are also much more likely to hold a bachelor’s 
degree than their domestic-born or native counterparts. They are twice as likely to possess a 
graduate degree.  
 
Differences become even greater when immigrants’ region of origin is separated, as in the 
cascading attainment profile of Figure VII-2.  
 
Figure VII-2. The cascading educational attainment profile of the 25+  by region of origin, 2005: Indiana.
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 Africa Asia 
Canada & 
Oceania Europe 
Latin 
America US born 
No diploma 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Diploma 82% 87% 92% 85% 47% 86% 
Some college 69% 72% 70% 47% 21% 48% 
Associates 51% 60% 62% 31% 11% 28% 
Bachelors 36% 54% 56% 24% 8% 21% 
Masters 15% 23% 30% 12% 3% 7% 
Doctorate or first professional 7% 3% 16% 4% 2% 2% 
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A significant portion of the state’s immigrant population is connected with a large body of 
foreign students and faculty on the state’s higher education campuses.
44
 Foreign-born students 
are concentrated among the Indiana’s larger research universities, as shown in Figure VII-3. 
 
Figure VII-3. Fall 2004 non-resident alien enrollment by institution.
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The four-year institutional 
enrollments shown in Figure VII-3 
are relatively high. For example, 
the percentage of Purdue 
University-West Lafayette’s 
student body that is non-resident 
alien is higher than the percentage 
of any public California four-year 
campus. The degree to which the 
non-resident alien percentage of 
enrollment would increase with a more prosperous Indiana future is an open question. Neither 
Indiana University’s nor Purdue’s admissions policies are under formal obligation to give 
quantitative preference to in-state students, at least not at their main campuses. While their 
missions and charters give informal preference, budget constraints make out-of-state students 
attractive, though in a more prosperous Indiana economy, the tightness of these constraints 
could relax. 
 
While non-resident alien enrollment in the state’s public four-year universities is relatively high, 
the enrollment in Indiana’s two-year universities is shockingly low. The total reported 
enrollment for this category is 88 students, representing a scant one-tenth of one percent of total 
enrollment. 
 
This does not make Indiana unusual. Even California, with its enormous foreign-born 
population, has a non-resident alien enrollment of just 1.4 percent in its two-year college 
system. Illinois’ is 0.4 percent. Indiana’s low rate is thus a reflection of the college attendance 
patterns of a particular segment of the foreign-born, Hispanics. A measure of this behavior is 
shown in Figure VII-4.  
 
Figure VII-4. Percentage of 15-17 year olds attending school and 18-24 year olds attending college, by 
race/ethnicity
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15-17 year-olds attending school  18-24 year-olds attending college 
Hispanic  88%   Hispanic  9% 
Asian  97%   Asian  74% 
Total  94%   Total  34% 
  
Even at the secondary level, Hispanic attendance lags far behind the rest of the state. At the 
college level, their attendance is truly comparably miniscule. As the fastest growing source of 
population growth in the state, Hispanic high school and college attendance patterns totally 
imperil the future growth envisioned by the previous sections of this Working Paper. The 
striking degree of difference in Hispanic attendance patterns, as well as their general uniformity 
across the nation, suggests that the solution must truly be a systemic one. This will be true of the 
primary and secondary systems. It may be particularly true of the post-secondary system and 
involve the creation of institutional structures different from anything that has been seen before. 
 
 
Purdue University system 4,905 
Indiana University system 3,658 
University of Notre Dame du Lac system 1,060 
Indiana University/Purdue University cooperative system 1,017 
University of Indianapolis 672 
Indiana State University 448 
Ball State University 205 
University of Evansville 104 
University of Southern Indiana 101 
Other public four-year 854 
Public two-year 88 
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Appendix 1 
The Foreign-Born Population of Indiana 
 
As Figure A-1 reveals, Indiana’s foreign-born population comes from all over the world, with 
one country of origin standing far above any other.  
 
Figure A-1. Indiana’s foreign-born population, 2005: country of origin and population
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Mexico 98,698 Jamaica 2,022 Brazil 853 Bangladesh 445 
China 13,252 Greece 1,918 Hungary 767 Other N Amer 443 
India 10,628 Romania 1,901 Syria 751 Other Oceania 402 
Germany 8,042 Yugoslavia 1,730 Cuba 693 Spain 393 
Korea 7,823 Honduras 1,699 Turkey 690 Argentina 388 
Canada 6,784 Kenya 1,324 South Africa 669 Guyana 364 
Other Africa 6,694 Laos 1,317 Nigeria 643 Iraq 357 
Other Europe 6,148 Thailand 1,315 Czech Rep & Slov 605 Afghanistan 325 
United Kingdom 5,779 Croatia 1,217 Indonesia 568 Ghana 303 
Vietnam 5,423 Venezuela 1,217 Ethiopia 532 Panama 276 
Philippines 5,123 Italy 1,090 Trinidad & Tobago 526 Chile 220 
Japan 4,985 Pakistan 1,084 Dominican Republic 510 Ecuador 205 
Other Asia 3,831 Netherlands 1,075 Israel 505 Nicaragua 199 
El Salvador 3,667 Iran 1,025 Haiti 482 Bolivia 195 
Guatemala 3,388 Bosnia & Herz 1,008 Liberia 477 Lebanon 193 
Poland 2,688 Other Latin America 999 Costa Rica 465 Cambodia 163 
Peru 2,647 France 927 Ireland 465 Uruguay 71 
Ukraine 2,627 Colombia 868 Austria 459 Armenia 61 
Russia 2,462 Egypt 862 Australia 457 Portugal 59 
 
At more than forty percent, the share of Mexican-born in Indiana’s foreign-born population is 
higher than Mexicans’ share in the foreign-born population of the US as a whole, and much 
higher than its neighbors besides Illinois.  
 
Figure A-2. Three top countries of birth for foreign-born, 2005 (Country and  percent of state’s immigrant pop.)
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Indiana Illinois Michigan Ohio Kentucky US 
Mexico 40.7% Mexico 40.9% Mexico 14.1% Mexico 10.2% Mexico 24.6% Mexico 30.7% 
China 5.5% Poland 8.9% India 8.6% India 8.2% Germany 6.2% China 4.9% 
India 4.4% India 6.1% Canada 7.7% China 6.5% India 5.9% Philippines 4.5% 
 
Section III discussed the settlement patterns of immigrants in Indiana. Figure A-3 shows in 
more detail where they have been settling.  
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Figure A-3. Indiana’s Foreign-born population as a share of counties’ total population, 2005.
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County 
Foreign-
born 
Pop. 
Share 
of 
total 
Pop. County 
Foreign-
born 
Pop. 
Share 
of 
total 
Pop. County 
Foreign-
born 
Pop. 
Share 
of 
total 
Pop. County 
Foreign-
born 
Pop. 
Share 
of 
total 
Pop. County 
Foreign-
born 
Pop. 
Share 
of 
total 
Pop. 
Tippecanoe 12,167 8.17% Jackson 991 2.40% Boone 683 1.48% Hancock 508 0.92% Clay 150 0.56% 
Elkhart 12,982 7.10% Newton 340 2.33% Delaware 1,754 1.48% Gibson 298 0.92% Henry 259 0.53% 
Monroe 6,566 5.45% Carroll 435 2.16% Montgomery 546 1.45% Spencer 682 0.90% Parke 88 0.51% 
Lake 25,848 5.33% LaGrange 738 2.11% Steuben 473 1.42% Morgan 580 0.87% Fayette 130 0.51% 
Noble 2,260 4.88% Dubois 828 2.09% Warrick 656 1.25% Wells 233 0.84% Washington 136 0.50% 
Clinton 1,613 4.76% Fulton 412 2.01% Jefferson 381 1.20% Huntington 321 0.84% Switzerland 45 0.50% 
Marion 39,386 4.58% Vigo 2,119 2.00% Grant 874 1.19% Whitley 256 0.83% Posey 130 0.48% 
St. Joseph 184 4.56% Daviess 571 1.91% Madison 1,587 1.19% Dearborn 381 0.83% Greene 152 0.46% 
Marshall 1,998 4.43% Howard 1,487 1.75% Floyd 825 1.16% Orange 158 0.82% Scott 113 0.41% 
Cass 1,763 4.31% Clark 1,686 1.75% Knox 430 1.10% DeKalb 322 0.80% Perry 78 0.41% 
Allen 13,394 4.04% Johnson 1,971 1.71% Putnam 389 1.08% Benton 74 0.79% Owen 87 0.40% 
Hamilton 7,283 3.99% Vanderburgh 2,794 1.63% Adams 360 1.07% Pulaski 108 0.79% Union 28 0.38% 
Bartholomew 2,683 3.76% Decatur 394 1.60% Tipton 173 1.04% Vermillion 131 0.78% Crawford 36 0.34% 
White 894 3.54% Hendricks 1,663 1.60% Fountain 185 1.03% Randolph 200 0.73% Warren 27 0.32% 
Porter 4,359 2.97% Shelby 95 1.57% Brown 151 1.01% Jennings 201 0.73% Rush 55 0.30% 
Kosciusko 2,142 2.89% Wayne 1,086 1.53% Miami 345 0.96% Wabash 239 0.68% Sullivan 61 0.28% 
Starke 619 2.63% Jay 330 1.51% Harrison 319 0.93% Ripley 179 0.67% Martin 27 0.26% 
LaPorte 2,730 2.48% Jasper 452 1.50% Lawrence 425 0.93% Franklin 143 0.65% Blackford 19 0.14% 
         Pike 74 0.58% Ohio 6 0.11% 
 
 
 
 
The beginning of this section showed greater diversity of the foreign-born population in Indiana 
than many people assume. Of the 92 counties in Indiana in 2000, in only 38 did a majority of 
the foreign-born population originate from even a single region or the world. Only 19 counties 
had populations that originated from a single country. The following narrative and table 
examine the county-by-county patterns of these populations in the context of their places of 
origin.  
 
Figure A-4. The share of foreign-born population by Indiana’s major cities’ home counties, 2000.
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Allen 
County 
Lake 
County 
Marion 
County 
St. 
Joseph 
County 
Vanderburgh 
County 
Total: 13394 25848 39386 12113 2794 
Europe: 23.56% 34.91% 17.88% 25.23% 26.70% 
Asia: 28.80% 14.24% 26.33% 25.06% 50.64% 
Eastern Asia: 4.32% 3.79% 8.14% 11.29% 17.82% 
China: 1.49% 1.30% 4.37% 5.32% 5.91% 
South Central Asia: 6.82% 4.55% 7.73% 5.30% 11.42% 
India 4.40% 3.64% 5.37% 4.18% 8.70% 
Western Asia: 1.47% 1.92% 1.41% 2.77% 5.55% 
Africa: 3.96% 2.47% 7.21% 6.55% 0.79% 
Americas: 43.53% 48.20% 48.14% 42.76% 21.55% 
Latin America: 37.56% 46.18% 45.76% 36.79% 17.14% 
Central America: 31.07% 43.23% 38.83% 32.45% 8.63% 
Mexico 27.23% 41.79% 33.57% 29.92% 8.63% 
South America: 3.86% 1.43% 3.45% 3.21% 4.80% 
Northern America: 5.97% 2.02% 2.38% 5.98% 4.40% 
 
 
A large European contingent represented the majority of foreign-born populations in nine 
counties—Benton, Boone, Crawford, Greene, Henry, Martin, Owen, Parke, and Starke. Not 
surprisingly, these counties are not major destinations for Indiana’s current wave of 
immigration. Of the nine, all but Starke (first quartile) and Boone (second quartile) fell in the 
bottom half of all counties in terms of their share of foreign-born population. Combined, these 
nine counties claimed only 2,025 of Indiana’s 186,534 total Year 2000 foreign-born population.  
 
There were six counties in which the majority of the foreign-born population was majority 
Asian: Blackford, Decatur, Monroe, Tipton, Vanderburgh, and Wabash. An additional six 
counties had a foreign-born population that was significantly (40 percent-49 percent) Asian: 
Delaware, Hamilton, Rush, Switzerland, Tippecanoe, and Vigo. The fact that three of these 
counties—Delaware Tippecanoe, Monroe, and Vigo—are home to major centers of higher 
education is obviously no coincidence. 
 
Again, however, most of these heavily Asian counties are not heavily immigrant. Only two—
Vanderburgh and Decatur—had a share of the population that was foreign-born population 
which ranked in the upper half of all Indiana counties. 
 
Twenty-three Indiana counties had a foreign-born population in which a majority was from 
Latin America. These counties included Carroll, Cass, Clinton, Daviess, Dubois, Elkhart, 
Fulton, Harrison, Jackson, Jay, Kosciusko, LaGrange, Marshall, Montgomery, Newton, Noble, 
Ohio, Pulaski, Randolph, Spencer, Steuben, Warren, and White. Of these, only in Dubois 
County was a majority not claimed by the Mexican-born. 
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These counties are most definitely major destinations for Indiana’s new waves of immigrants. 
Nearly half are in the first quartile of all counties in terms of the share of total population that is 
foreign-born: Elkhart, Noble, Clinton, Marshall, Cass, White, Kosciusko, Jackson, Newton, 
Carroll, LaGrange, and Dubois. Only two are in the bottom quartile—Orange and Ohio. 
 
The five major cities in Indiana—Indianapolis, Fort Wayne, Evansville, South Bend, and 
Gary—are located within Marion, Allen, Vanderburgh, St. Joseph, and Lake County, 
respectively. Marion, Lake, and Allen all had the three largest stocks of foreign-born 
populations in the state. St. Joseph County had a much smaller foreign-born population, but was 
also located in the first quartile of all counties in terms of the share of total population that was 
foreign born. Vanderburgh County was in the second quartile.  
 
The larger cities’ immigrant populations are relatively diverse, as shown in Figure 6. However, 
their foreign-born populations were by no means evenly spread over geographic regions. The 
Latin American populations in Allen, Lake, Marion, and St. Joseph Counties were all 40 percent 
or more of the foreign-born population. All but Lake County had foreign-born populations that 
were at least one-quarter Asian (with Vanderburgh County more than 50 percent Asian). 
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